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INDIVIDUALS AS “EMPLOYEES” OR
“CONTRACTORS”: WHY IT MATTERS
WHAT YOU ARE CALLED WHEN IT COMES
TO FEDERAL TAXES
Robert Eisentrout *
ABSTRACT
When we file federal taxes, our individual tax burdens are affected by whether
our employers and the IRS classify us as “employees” or “contractors.” Today,
that distinction is not a neat one. Classifying workers as “employees” or
“contractors” belies increasing similarities—like the ability to work remotely
during the COVID-19 pandemic—between those classifications. With those
increasing similarities in mind, this Note makes two arguments about the
employee / contractor distinction in federal tax law. First, federal tax law draws
an increasingly arbitrary and unfair line between employees and contractors
given the modern substantive convergence of work done as an “employee” or a
“contractor.” And second, updating how this distinction is drawn and applied
within federal tax law can better serve the purposes of the provisions that treat
employees and contractors differently. While federal tax law is not alone in
promulgating inequities surrounding this distinction, this Note chose to focus on
federal tax law’s application of the distinction for two reasons. Federal tax law
already has tools it can use to shift workers toward one classification or another,
so there is less need for a large legislative overhaul, which means it will not take
as much to effect change. Also, shifting worker classification could help remedy
problems currently facing federal tax law. As a result, federal tax law should be
motivated by self-interest to acknowledge the similarities between employees
and contractors today. With that motivation and the tools to effect change,
federal tax law is the perfect area of law to start championing an updated
application of the employee / contractor distinction which reflects the modern
workforce. The law just needs a nudge in the right direction.

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2022, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Professor
Jim Hines for his wonderful insights, constructive feedback, and encouraging supervision throughout
this project. Thank you as well to the Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review team for
their clear communication and editorial support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal tax law holds there is a difference between individual workers who
are called employees and individual workers who are called contractors.
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code apply differently depending on which
classification a worker receives. But today there is an increasingly dim line
dividing workers that employers and the Internal Revenue Service consider to be
“employees” or “contractors.” Terms like “gig economy” and “freelancers” swirl
in the national discourse, cases are litigated over the appropriate classification of
workers like Uber drivers, 1 and the COVID-19 pandemic has forced a significant
portion of the U.S. workforce to work from home—blurring a traditional
difference in where employees and contractors typically work compared to one
another. Other differences are dissipating, too. Today, there is an increasing
substantive convergence between “employees” and “contractors” in terms of (1)
flexibility of schedule and autonomy over completing work, 2 (2) number of
payors, 3 and (3) the increasing legal uncertainty regarding accurately classifying
a worker as one or the other. 4 In light of that convergence, this Note will consider

1. E.g., James v. Uber Techs. Inc., NO.19-cv-06462-EMC, 2021 WL 254303 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
26, 2021).
2. Katherine Lim et al., Independent Contractors in the U.S.: New Trends from 15 Years of
Administrative Tax Data, 2-3 (I.R.S., Working Paper, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/19rpindcontractorinus.pdf (also noting that “individuals who are contractors might incorrectly
identify themselves as employees due to the often similar nature of their relationship with a firm”).
3. Brett Collins et al., Is Gig Work Replacing Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two
Decades of Tax Returns 14 (I.R.S., Working Paper, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf (noting that “it is no more common for wage
earners to be tied to a single employer than it is for contractors to be tied to a single payer firm”).
4. See Lim et al., supra note 2, at 3 n.2-4.
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whether it is desirable for the federal tax provisions that treat employees and
contractors differently to continue to do so given indicia of the purposes for which
those sections were enacted. 5 This Note’s two main arguments are that (1) federal
tax law draws an increasingly arbitrary and unfair line between employees and
contractors given the modern substantive convergence of work done as an
“employee” or a “contractor”; and (2) updating how the distinction is drawn and
applied can better serve the purposes of the federal tax provisions that treat
employees and contractors differently.
Before this Note dives into that analysis, it believes that comparing the
ordinary definitions of “employee” and “contractor” with the way federal tax law
defines those terms will help provide some general context for understanding why
federal tax law may have decided to treat employees and contractors differently.
In terms of ordinary meaning, “employee” means “one employed by another
usually for wages or salary and in a position below the executive level.” 6 And
“contractor” means “one that contracts to perform work . . . .” 7 The difference
between the ordinary definitions of the terms focuses on the regularity of payment
rather than the method of agreement to provide services or the structure of the
work relationship. 8 Federal tax law also cares about the regularity of payments,
but bases its distinction more so on the relationship structure between an
employer and a worker. 9
For federal tax purposes, a worker is considered an “employee” if they have
“the status of an employee under the usual common law rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship.” 10 The usual common law
rules applicable for that determination in the context of federal tax law yield an
aptly named multifactor balancing test that focuses on the amount of control an

5. This Note will refer to such purposes as the purposes for which the provisions were
enacted. However, this Note wanted to use the phrase “indicia of purposes” at the beginning here to
acknowledge all the inherent difficulties in discerning legislative purpose. Namely, difficulties
regarding aggregation (whether we can say there was a legislative consensus on the reason for passing
these provisions) and attribution (whether we can attribute the statement of one legislator to the
majority that enacted the provision). Despite those difficulties, this Note believes the sources it relies
on in search of the purposes for enacting these provisions are sufficiently reliable to support this
Note’s argument that such indicia of purposes do indeed reveal the purposes for which the provisions
were enacted.
6. Employee, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/employee (last
visited Feb. 11, 2021).
7. Contractor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contractor (last
visited Feb. 11, 2021).
8. For while all “employees” are “contractors” in the ordinary sense given that employees execute
a contract with their employer to gain employment, “contractors” contracting to perform work (i.e., specific
projects) do not receive wages or salary, which have a connotation of payment at regular intervals.See Wage,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wage (last visited Feb. 11, 2021); see
Salary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/salary (last visited Feb. 11,
2011).
9. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Tax Law’s Workplace Shift, 100 B.U. L. REV. 651,
683-84 (2020).
10. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
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employer has over a worker: the “common law control test.” 11 Specifically,
federal tax law employs a non-exhaustive list of twenty factors to distinguish
employees from contractors. 12 The general gist of the factors is that if a worker
is subject to an employer’s control in both (1) what gets done and (2) how that
gets done, they will typically be considered an employee for federal tax
purposes. 13
That said, given the vastness of the multifactor balancing test for this
distinction, there is, perhaps predictably, leeway surrounding which classification
a worker will receive. This Note believes such leeway is worth highlighting
because it shows that federal tax law already has tools that can help it bring more
workers into one classification or the other if doing so would better serve the
purposes of the provisions that currently treat the two classifications differently.
Among the most prominent contributors for such leeway are (1) Section 530 of
the Revenue Act of 1978, which is a safe harbor provision that permits an
employer to classify a worker as a contractor as long as they have treated the
worker as such, and a “reasonable basis” exists for such treatment; 14 and (2) the
IRS training materials regarding this distinction acknowledging that “the relative
importance and weight of the twenty common law factors can vary
significantly.” 15 But to determine whether federal tax law may want to employ
those tools to treat workers more as employees or contractors under certain

11. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 684 (noting that in embracing the common law control test,
the federal income tax rejected the “economic realities test,” which is another test recognized in the
context of federal regulation for distinguishing employees from contractors).
12. Rev. Rul. 87-41, supra note 10 (identifying the twenty factors as (1) instructions; (2)
training; (3) integration; (4) services rendered personally; (5) hiring, supervising, and paying
assistants; (6) continuing relationship; (7) set hours of work; (8) full time required; (9) doing work on
employer’s premises; (10) order or sequence set; (11) oral or written reports; (12) payment by hour,
week, month; (13) payment of business and/or traveling expenses; (14) furnishing of tools or
materials; (15) significant investment; (16) realization of profit or loss; (17) working for more than
one firm at a time; (18) making service available to the general public; (19) right to discharge; and
(20) right to terminate); WILLIAM HAYS WEISSMAN, SECTION 530: ITS HISTORY AND APPLICATION
IN LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FOR FEDERAL
TAX PURPOSES 4 (National Ass’n of Tax Reporting and Professional Management Feb. 28, 2009).
13. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 684. For example, if worker A is told by employer B to create
a report by calling persons C, D, and E, substantiating those interviews with research from a certain
database, formatting the report in accordance with training worker A received from the employer, and
to have it on a boss’ desk by Monday morning, worker A would probably be considered an employee
for federal tax purposes. Conversely, if worker A was merely told to have a report on a boss’ desk by
Monday morning, worker A would probably be considered a contractor for federal tax purposes. This
example intends to show that if the employer controls the results but not the way in which the work
gets done, the worker will typically be considered a contractor for federal tax purposes.
14. See Weissman, supra note 12, at 6.
15. IRS, Independent Contractor or Employee? Training Materials, DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, at 2-4 (Oct. 30, 1996), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/emporind.pdf. That said, the
training materials do clarify that evidence that can be most persuasive can be categorized within three
categories: (1) behavioral control, (2) financial control, and (3) relationship of the parties. However,
only the “presence or absence of instructions and training on how work is to be done” is signaled
among all the factors as ones that are especially relevant. Id. at 2-32.
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provisions of the I.R.C., we first need to understand how exactly federal taxes
treat employees and contractors differently.
Part II of this Note will do so, identifying five prominent ways in which the
federal taxes treat employees differently than contractors. Specifically, it will
highlight differences regarding (1) Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment
payroll taxes; (2) federal income tax withholding, (3) contractors being
considered businesses and business deductions; (4) the exclusion of certain work
benefits from taxable income; and (5) section 199A, introduced by the 2017 Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which provides a 20 percent deduction for qualified
business income eligible to contractors but not employees. Part II will conclude
with a summary of the differences, purposes, recommendations regarding this
distinct treatment, and statements about whether it is more advantageous to be
classified as one type of worker or the other for each subpart. Part III will apply
Part II’s takeaways by briefly analyzing scholarly proposed tax reform regarding
the disparate treatment of employees and contractors; namely Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas’ proposed (1) “non-employee withholding” on earnings paid out by
online platform companies like Uber; and (2) “standard business deduction” for
gig workers. 16 Part IV concludes.
II. FEDERAL TAX DIFFERENCES FOR EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS
Each subsection in this Part will adhere to a uniform order of analysis. First,
this Note will present how each aspect of federal tax law currently treats
employees and contractors differently. To help illustrate the difference in each
subsection, this Note will use two characters who will remain with us throughout
the analysis: “Employee” and “Contractor,” who are single taxpayers who both
generated $100,000 of value as a result of their work in the 2020 taxable year.
Second, this Note will investigate the purposes Congress sought to pursue by
enacting these provisions. Lastly, this Note will analyze whether such purposes
would be better served today if (1) all workers were treated like employees; or
(2) all workers were treated like contractors. In doing so, this Note will identify
problems arising with such potential changes and propose a desirable shift toward
one classification or the other, if appropriate.
A. Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Taxes
Both employees and contractors must pay payroll taxes that support Social
Security and Medicare. For employees, these taxes are collectively referred to as
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes. 17 For contractors, these taxes
are called Self-Employment Contribution Act of 1954 (SECA) taxes. 18 The

16.
(2018).
17.
18.

Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1418
Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 670.
Id.
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difference in the way these payroll taxes apply to employees and contractors is
seen in who pays these taxes, and how much each classification of worker pays.
Both employees and contractors incur a total tax of 12.4% of their pay to support
Social Security and a total tax of 2.9% of their pay to fund Medicare. 19 However,
employees nominally split these taxes with their employers, where both the
employee and employer are responsible for paying half of the total amount owed
for these taxes. 20 Additionally, employers handle all the reporting and payment
obligations of these taxes for their employees. 21 Contractors, on the other hand,
are responsible for paying the entirety of these taxes by themselves and for
reporting that amount to the IRS 22 So, these taxes impose different substantive
and procedural obligations for a worker depending on if they are classified as an
employee or a contractor. The last wrinkle is that employers who hire employees
are subject to an additional payroll tax—the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) tax 23—which imposes a “payroll tax equal to 6% of the first $7,000 in
wages.” 24 However, employers can decrease their FUTA tax liability to 0.6% by
paying a sufficient amount into state unemployment funds. 25 Conversely,
employers that hire contractors are not subject to paying FUTA taxes for that
worker. Therefore, employees subject their employers to greater tax liability than
contractors do just by the nature of the worker classification.
The additional tax liability incurred by employers who hire employees rather
than hiring contractors should, in theory, factor into how much each worker is
paid given the value their work generates. For the purposes of this Note, we will
assume market forces only contemplate (1) the value of the work that our
characters (Employee and Contractor) generate; and (2) the additional FICA and
FUTA tax liability imposed on employers who hire an employee. Therefore,
while Contractor will be paid $100,000 for the $100,000 of value their work

19. See I.R.C. § 3101(a), (b) (establishing a 6.2% tax on an employee’s wages under (a) to
help fund Social Security and a 1.45% tax on an employee’s wages under (b) to help fund Medicare);
see also I.R.C. § 3111(a), (b) (establishing another 6.2% and 1.45% tax, respectively, on an
employee’s wages that must be paid by the employer, bringing the total to 12.4% for Social Security
taxes and 2.9% for Medicare taxes); see also I.R.C. § 1401 (establishing the same total taxes on selfemployment income, which is how contractors pay these taxes); but see Contribution and Benefit
Base, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (https://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/cbb.html) (limiting the 12.4% for Social
Security tax to the first $137,700 of wages in 2020). There is no such comparable limit for the 2.9%
for Medicare taxes.
20. Compare I.R.C. § 3101, with I.R.C. § 3111.
21. See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 670.
22. I.R.C. § 1401; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 670-71.
23. I.R.C. § 3301.
24. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 671.
25. Id. (“The unemployment insurance system is a unified federal-state system and
unemployment taxes are paid at the state and federal levels. Employers can claim a credit of up to
5.4% against their federal FUTA tax liability for amounts paid to state unemployment funds (‘SUTA’
taxes), thereby reducing their federal FUTA tax to 0.6%.”).
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generates, Employee will only be paid about $92,380 26 by their employer for the
same $100,000 value as a result of their employer having to cover $5,728 in
Social Security tax, 27 $1,340 in Medicare tax, 28 and $554 in FUTA tax (assuming
they reduce their FUTA tax liability as low as they can). 29 Going forward in this
Note, we will thus operate with the understanding that Employee has $92,380 of
income while Contractor has $100,000 of income, despite both producing the
same value for their work.
Employee would owe the same amount as their employer for Social Security
and Medicare taxes. 30 That sum of $7,068 for Employee’s FICA taxes would be
withheld and paid by Employee’s employer on behalf of Employee while the
employer would also pay that same amount again to cover its share of FICA tax
liability. 31 Contractor, on the other hand, would owe $12,400 in Social Security
tax 32 and $2,900 in Medicare tax. 33 Contractor would see what they owe in total
for SECA taxes ($15,300) come into their pocket as they collect their $100,000
of income, but would have to report and pay in full their SECA tax liability when
they file their tax return.
Despite generating the same value from their work ($100,000) and incurring
the same tax liability in terms of percentages for their FICA and SECA taxes,
respectively, the way these payroll taxes treat employees and contractors
differently results in Contractor paying $1,164 more in SECA taxes than
Employee and Employee’s employer end up paying in total FICA taxes. 34 Now,
if we also take into account the additional $554 in tax liability to which Employee
will subject their employer due to FUTA tax, then the overall difference for these
payroll taxes collected based on worker classification drops to about $610. While
that amount (1) may seem insignificant given the overall income of the two

26. Employee generates $100,000 of value, but only gets paid about $92,392 because the
employer will be required to pay 7.65% in payroll taxes and 0.6% for FUTA tax (assuming employer
is able to take the maximum tax credit for payment into state unemployment programs). The math,
where X is Employee’s salary, is: X + (0.0765+0.006)X = $100,000, which then results in X
amounting to about $92,380.
27. I.R.C. § 3111(a) (multiplying $92,380 by 0.062, which results in $5,727.56).
28. I.R.C. § 3111(b) (multiplying $92,380 by 0.0145, which results in $1,339.51).
29. See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 671 (explaining that employers can reduce their net
FUTA tax liability to 0.6% if they pay enough into a state unemployment fund and claim up to a 5.4%
credit against their FUTA tax liability, which, in this hypothetical, yields $554 as a result of
multiplying $92,380 by 0.006).
30. I.R.C. § 3101(a), (b).
31. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 670; I.R.C. § 3111(a), (b).
32. I.R.C. § 1401(a) (imposing a 12.4% tax on Contractor’s income. $100,000 multiplied by
12.4% = $12,400).
33. I.R.C. § 1401(b) (imposing a 2.9% tax on Contractor’s income. $100,000 multiplied by
2.9% = $2,900).
34. Using the calculations above, this Note reaches the amount of $1,164 because
Contractor’s $15,300 in total SECA taxes exceeds the sum of (1) the $7,068 Employee ends up owing
for their half of FICA taxes, and (2) that same amount ($7,068) Employee’s employer ends up owing
for its half of FICA taxes.
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characters; and (2) may be slightly less or more depending on the exact economic
forces exerted by the market in reality (the analysis of which is beyond the scope
of this Note), the takeaway is that there is a difference regarding tax liability for
these payroll taxes depending on which classification a worker receives. In terms
of how much money ends up in Employee’s and Contractor’s pockets solely as a
result of this difference, Employee will take home $85,312 (never seeing the
$7,068 in FICA taxes they owe because that will be withheld by their Employer
throughout their paychecks for that year) while Contractor will take home
$84,700—a difference of $612 (with the $2 difference between this amount and
the “about $610” referenced above explained by the rounding of numbers through
these calculations). Whether that difference is significant enough to warrant a
change in the way these payroll taxes currently apply to employees and
contractors must be evaluated in light of the purpose for the distinct treatment.
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act was enacted to fund the Social
Security program. 35 The Self-Employment Contributions Act of 1954 was
enacted as an equitable measure to acquire a portion of self-employed income to
fund that program just as the income of employees was doing because some selfemployed workers had begun to receive Social Security benefits starting in
1950. 36 And when Medicare was established in 1965, FICA and SECA taxes
were expanded to cover funding that program as well. 37
These purposes reveal an attempt to make these taxes apply the same for each
worker, regardless of whether that worker was considered an employee or a
contractor. But as the analysis above shows, there is at least some difference in
the amount employees and contractors end up paying for these payroll taxes. And
given that there is a difference, there is at least a question of whether a shift in the
Internal Revenue Code to treating all workers like employees or contractors for
FICA or SECA tax purposes could better serve the aim of funding the Social
Security and Medicare programs.
The Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees, in their summary of
the 2020 annual reports on the status of the programs, acknowledged that “both
face long-term financing shortfalls under currently scheduled benefits and
financing.” 38 More pointedly, the Trustees estimated that the reserves used to
fund Social Security will be unable to pay scheduled benefits on a timely basis

35. Compare, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 1013,
1041 (1958) (describing one “rate of tax” as 3.5% for the years 1963-65), with Social Security
Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 87-64, 75 Stat. 131, 139 (1961) (describing those same years as
now have a rate of 3.675%).
36. PAUL BURNHAM, CONG. BUDGET OFF., PUB. NO. 4168, THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND
LABOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 1 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/09-27-SECA.pdf.
37. See id.
38. SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS, A SUMMARY OF THE 2020 ANNUAL REPORTS III (2020),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr20summary.pdf.
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starting in 2035. 39 And the Trustees’ estimates regarding Medicare triggered a
“Medicare funding warning” for the third year in a row, noting that the “Hospital
Insurance (HI) Trust Fund, which pays Medicare Part A inpatient hospital
expenses, will be able to pay scheduled benefits until 2026,” after which the
reserves will be “depleted and continuing program income will be sufficient to
pay [only] 90 percent of total scheduled benefits.” 40 One way to potentially
address these financing shortfalls could be to change the way in which these
payroll taxes are collected from workers.
If all workers were treated like employees for Social Security and Medicare
tax purposes, then any payor would be responsible for paying half of that
worker’s payroll taxes. 41 In theory, payors knowing that would then factor such
tax liability into how much they would be willing to pay workers for a certain
amount of value generated from that worker’s work. We can see this at play in
the context of this Note’s hypothetical characters and its conception of the effect
of market forces, where Employee’s employer knew that they would (1) have to
pay half of Employee’s FICA taxes and (2) incur FUTA tax liability, leading the
employer to pay Employee less overall. Employee got paid less than the value of
the work they generated as a result. And getting paid fewer wages, in turn,
decreased the amount of payroll taxes collected by Employee and their employer,
all because of the way the Internal Revenue Code splits the method of payment
of these taxes for employees. Given this conclusion, there might be a way to
better serve the funding purpose of these payroll taxes: treat all workers like
contractors.
If all workers were treated like contractors for Social Security and Medicare
tax purposes, each worker would be on the hook for paying the full amount of
these payroll taxes themselves. 42 In the analysis at the beginning of this section,
we saw that Contractor was paid the full $100,000 of value their work generated,
and as a result owed $15,300 in SECA taxes. This amount ended up being $1,164
more than what Employee and their employer paid in total. Now, this Note
admits that market forces not considered in this Note will affect how much
workers actually get paid for the value of their work, and that individual workers
will have expenses which lower the wage base against which these payroll taxes
are calculated (see subsection 3 in this Part). That means that outside of this
sterile scholarly analysis, contractors that generate the same value of work as their
employee counterparts will not always pay more in Social Security and Medicare
taxes. But this analysis shows that, as a starting point, contractors are
theoretically paying more in these payroll taxes than their employee counterparts
are simply because of how the IRS collects these taxes. 43 And because of that, if

39. Id.
40. Id. at IV.
41. See I.R.C. § 3111(a).
42. I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b).
43. There are a whole host of other considerations here that are simply beyond the scope of
this Note that affect this analysis. For instance, this difference will increase or decrease as the value
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these payroll taxes were collected from workers as if they were contractors (i.e.,
the payors would not be responsible for paying half), then this change could help
further the goal of these taxes: funding Social Security and Medicare.
However, there is one significant counterargument that likely would cut
harshly against this treatment actually increasing funding for the Social Security
and Medicare programs. The tax gap for contractors is significantly larger than
it is for employers. 44 Given that, asking all workers to (1) make sure they save
enough money to pay these taxes each year, and (2) keep track of how much they
owe in these taxes could end up mitigating any gain toward funding these
programs that could result from treating all workers as contractors for Social
Security and Medicare tax purposes. The difference in the amount collected from
each classification of worker in the analysis above is, admittedly, relatively
negligible, and certainly subject to more market forces that are not considered in
this Note. That means that while theoretically payroll taxes could pull in more
revenue just by making all workers pay it all, like contractors already do, the
revenue gap shows us that the reality of this change might end up exacerbating
the funding worries for these programs.
Because of that counterargument, this Note argues that such a drastic shift to
treating all workers like contractors for payroll tax purposes is unwarranted. That
does not mean, however, that any change is unwarranted. Perhaps there is room
for the Internal Revenue Code to treat more employees like contractors regarding
payroll taxes for the purposes of getting more funding for the Social Security and
Medicare programs—maybe focusing on workers with histories of sterling tax
compliance. This would serve as a boon for those workers pulled in by this
change because they would start seeing more money come into their pockets each
paycheck (despite being earmarked to pay payroll taxes come tax filing season),
thus giving them the time-value of that “extra” money. But that line-drawing is
difficult, and the same worries about the revenue gap and compliance remain.
This Note’s aim is not to find the exact sweet spot regarding worker classification
for payroll tax purposes, but to point out that the way in which these taxes are
collected affects the amount that is collected, and because of that, there is a
possibility change could beneficially serve the purpose of these provisions.

of the worker increases or decreases, respectively (though in 2020, Social Security taxes are only
calculated against the first $137,700 of wages; Medicare taxes don’t have a cap). And this Note does
not analyze whether employees or contractors get paid more, on average, which could also sway this
section’s analysis and recommendation. The point of the section is to just show that there is some
difference, and that these sections of the I.R.C. could be altered to help address Social Security and
Medicare’s anticipated funding shortfalls.
44. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX
GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011-2013, at 8 fig.1 (2019) [hereinafter Tax Gap Estimates]
(https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf) (underreporting of SECA taxes was estimated to have
contributed $45 billion to the tax gap while underreporting of FICA and unemployment taxes was
estimated to have contributed only $24 billion to the tax gap).
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B. Federal Income Tax Withholding
Employees have some of their wages withheld by their employer to cover
what the employee will owe in federal income tax for a certain pay period. 45 The
amount withheld depends on (1) the employee’s wages; (2) their Form W-4, on
which an employee identifies the withholding allowances to which they are
entitled; and (3) tables promulgated each year by the Secretary of the Treasury. 46
Contractors, on the other hand, do not have any of their compensation withheld
by their payors. Instead, contractors must make quarterly estimated income tax
payments, 47 which comprise a rough approximation of the withholding scheme
to which employees are subject. If contractors underpay their quarterly estimated
income tax payments (which could happen by simply failing to make the payment
at all), an additional tax is imposed on them. 48 To illustrate the effect of this
distinct treatment, let us look at how federal income tax withholding affects (or
does not affect) Employee and Contractor.
Employee, who is paid $92,380 in wages for the $100,000 of value their work
generates would have $15,243 withheld by their employer over the course of the
2020 taxable year. 49 Contractor, who is not subject to federal income tax
withholding, would have none withheld over the course of the 2020 taxable year.
If Employee and Contractor both took the standard deduction and Contractor also
took the deduction for half of their SECA tax liability 50 as the only ways of
reducing their gross income, 51 Employee would owe $20,440, 52 and Contractor
would owe $20,431 53 in federal income tax. Here, Employee’s employer would

45. I.R.C. § 3402(a).
46. I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1).
47. See I.R.C. § 6654(c).
48. I.R.C. § 6654(a); but see I.R.C. § 6654(e)(1) (exempting a contractor from this additional
underpayment tax if the contractor owes less than $1,000 in federal income tax for that taxable year).
49. See Internal Revenue Serv., Pub. 15-T, Federal Income Tax Withholding Methods 6
(2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15t.pdf (using the tables for automated payroll systems and
considering that $92,380 falls within the $90,325-$168,865 range, this amount is calculated as the
sum of (1) the $14,750 to be withheld as an initial measure for an adjusted annual wage in that range;
and (2) 24% of the amount Employee’s adjusted annual wage ($92,380 here) exceeds $90,325, which
here is $493.20).
50. See I.R.C. § 164(f)(1).
51. See generally I.R.C. § 63(c)(7)(A)(ii) (noting that there are special rules in place for
taxable years 2018 through 2025 which increase the standard deduction for all taxpayers other than
heads of households from the original amount of $3,000 as identified in (c)(2)(C) to $12,000).
Contractor would also likely take the qualified business income deduction under I.R.C. § 199A, giving
them a deduction for 20% of their net business income. But for simplicity’s sake in this section,
Contractor will only take the standard deduction and deduction for half of their SECA tax liability.
52. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (being applied to the $92,380 in wages minus the $12,000 standard
deduction, which equals $80,380, and requires $20,439.80 of federal income tax, which is the result
of (1) the $12,107 initially required for an adjusted taxable income in that range; plus (2) 31% of the
amount by which $80,380 exceeds $53,500 (which is $26,880, 31% of which is $8,332.80)).
53. See id. (being applied to $100,000 of income minus the $12,000 standard deduction and
$7,650 (half of Contractor’s SECA tax liability), which equals $80,350 and requires $20,430.50 of
federal income tax, which is the result of (1) the $12,107 initially required for an adjusted taxable
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already have withheld $15,243 of that amount, leaving Employee on the hook for
$5,197 when they file their 2020 tax return. If Contractor paid their estimated
quarterly taxes, Contractor would owe somewhere between nothing and $2,043
to satisfy their federal income tax obligation for the 2020 taxable year. 54
The current regime of federal income tax withholding was introduced by the
Current Tax Payment Act of 1943. 55 The withholding was described as a “main
feature” of the Act and focused primarily on increasing compliance in paying the
federal income tax. 56 Compliance remains a big issue particularly affected by the
employee / contractor distinction. The tax gap (the difference between the IRS’
estimated total true tax liability and tax paid voluntarily and timely 57) displays
the practical effect of this distinction in action when it comes to compliance.
Within the tax gap, the underreporting of individual income tax for business
income—i.e., the classification for income of individuals working as
contractors 58—is the single largest category of noncompliance. 59 And for a direct
comparison between contractors and employees, while not explicitly income tax
withholding, underreporting of SECA tax is almost double what underreporting

income in that range; plus (2) 31% of the amount by which $80,350 exceeds $53,500 (which is
$26,850, 31% of which is $8,323.50)).
54. See I.R.C. § 6654(d) (requiring that each estimated quarterly payment be 25 percent of
the required annual payment, with (B) defining “required annual payment” as the lesser of 90 percent
of the tax shown on the return for the taxable year or 100 percent of the tax shown on the return for
the preceding taxable year. For the purposes of this Note, that means Contractor would have either
paid 90% of what they owe in federal income tax already, leaving them with only $2,043.10 to pay,
or, assuming that Contractor earned $100,000 last year as well, nothing to pay using the latter
definition of “required annual payment”).
55. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-68, § 1622, 57 Stat. 126, 128 (1943)
(current version at I.R.C. § 3402).
56. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, Taxation in the United States, 330 (1954) (evincing that the
Secretary of the Treasury at the time, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., stated that withholding was the “‘best
available expedient’ to achieve a more convenient method for the payment of income taxes” and that
such a system of “collection-at-the-source [was] necessary to the very existence of the income tax.”).
Additionally, Randolph E. Paul, who worked for the Treasury Department and played a large role in
convincing Congress to enact withholding, championed such a regime’s benefits in terms of ease,
combatting inflation, and compliance. See id. at 331; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., The Tax
Gap, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-tax-gap (Oct. 21, 2020) (“All initiatives by the IRS to
improve tax collection are intended to narrow the tax gap and increase compliance.”).
57. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1.
58. Collins et al., supra note 3, at 8 (noting that “self-employment income . . . is considered
active business income by the IRS”).
59. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1. While this 2019 report only addressed
estimates of the tax gap for the 2011-2013 taxable years, the underreporting of individual income tax
from business income has been the single largest category of noncompliance for decades. See, e.g.,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Individual Income Tax Gap Estimates for 1985, 1988, and 1992, at 8,
tbl.3 (Apr. 1996).
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of FICA and unemployment tax is, 60 which strongly suggests that withholding
has a significant effect on increasing federal income tax compliance.
In light of the compliance purposes for federal income tax withholding, this
Note will analyze whether treating all workers as employees or treating all
workers as contractors would increase compliance. If all workers were treated
like employees, then every employer would have to withhold a certain amount of
what they pay each worker. 61 On its face, requiring employers to withhold a
portion of a paycheck any time they pay a worker would increase compliance. 62
And increasing compliance is the exact purpose for which the federal income tax
withholding provision was introduced. 63 Therefore, this treatment has significant
advantages for federal income tax compliance. But there are disadvantages as
well. Withholding a portion of what employers pay each worker requires
employers to know how much to withhold because the correct amount to withhold
changes based on that worker’s gross income from all sources of income, not just
what they are getting paid by that employer. 64 Therefore, treating all workers
like employees for federal income tax withholding purposes raises issues
concerning (1) estimation, (2) disclosure, and (3) increased administrative costs.
First, the worker will have to try to accurately estimate how much taxable
income they will have in a current year and report that to each employer, even if
they only work with that employer for one discrete project in the taxable year.
This raises problems about over-withholding for estimates that are too high
(privileging the government to the detriment of the taxpayer because the taxpayer
loses the time-value of that money), or under-withholding for estimates that are
too low (which undermines compliance, cutting against the very purpose for
which Congress enacted the federal income tax withholding provision). Second,
the worker will have to disclose the total amount of taxable income to every
employer, which could raise issues related to the confidentiality of business
strategy if that worker only does a certain amount of work for a limited number
of employers, where comparison between each employer could become
inevitable, leading to a certain employer gleaning insight about a competitor’s
business strategy. And third, each employer will have increased administrative
costs because they would be required to (1) store, (2) analyze, and (3) maintain
the confidentiality of a greater amount of information about each worker they
pay, which could result in each employer paying each worker less for each project
because funds that would otherwise go to the worker would be spent elsewhere.

60. Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1 (Underreporting of SECA taxes was
estimated to have contributed $45 billion to the tax gap while underreporting of FICA and
unemployment taxes was estimated to have contributed only $24 billion to the tax gap).
61. I.R.C. § 3402(a).
62. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1 (depicting FICA and unemployment tax
reporting, which applies to employees, as nearly twice as compliant as SECA tax reporting, which
contractors pay).
63. See PAUL, supra note 56, at 330-31.
64. See I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1).
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That said, there are counterarguments to each of these three disadvantages that
should be addressed.
For estimation concerns, the federal income tax already requires contractors
to file estimated quarterly taxes, 65 and understands that estimation will not always
be perfect. 66 The argument would then run something like this: if the Internal
Revenue Code deems inaccurate estimates acceptable for tax purposes, why
would workers incorrectly estimating what they think their total taxable income
will be raise a concern? To that counterargument, this Note has two responses.
First, the amount of workers estimating their taxes would increase drastically, and
the tax gap indicates that contractors are significantly less compliant in reporting
the total tax they owe when compared to employees. 67 And second, while tax
collection may be an imprecise science, the IRS would really like to collect what
they are owed. Such an influx of taxpayers having to estimate total taxable
income leading to withholding problems and subsequent compliance issues
would likely pose an unmanageable mess for the Treasury to handle. The
concerns relating to estimation are extreme—so much so that they on their own
are arguably sufficiently prohibitive of treating all workers as employees for
withholding purposes.
For disclosure concerns, the counterargument would be that the information
disclosed to each employer would not allow each employer to glean insight into
a competitor’s business strategy because an estimation regarding taxable income
on its own does not tell that employer how many other employers the worker has,
and therefore the chances each employer could allocate a certain amount of the
taxable income to a competitor are slim. This Note finds this counterargument
persuasive for two reasons. First, it shows the concerns related to disclosure are
not anywhere near the magnitude of the concerns relating to estimation. And
second, chances are that if one employer is hiring a worker to do a project that a
competitor would also hire that worker to do (as is the nature of contractor-type
work), market forces would likely lead each employer to pay a similar amount.
So, even to the extent that an employer could discern how much their competitors
paid each worker, that information is likely available already. Therefore, this
concern arguably is a minimal one that won’t affect this Note’s recommendation
significantly.
Finally, for administrative cost concerns, the counterargument would be that,
to the IRS, where it collects its tax revenue matters less than whether such revenue
is collected, and because the companies would have to pay other companies for
the increased data storage, analysis, and protection costs, those other companies
65. I.R.C. § 6654(c).
66. See I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1) (allowing each quarterly payment that ends up being 25% of only
90% of the tax shown on the return for the taxable year to still be considered the “required annual
payment” for the purposes of estimated income tax payments).
67. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1 (pertinently pointing to (1) individual
income tax for business income—i.e., the income of individuals working as contractors—as the
largest category of noncompliance; and (2) SECA tax underreporting (owed by contractors) being
nearly double that of FICA and unemployment tax reporting (owed by employees)).
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will have more income as a result, leading to them paying more federal income
tax and mitigating any decrease in income tax resulting from the actual workers
being paid less. This Note finds this counterargument somewhat persuasive, but
would note that, as of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, there is a significant
difference in the tax rate for corporations compared to tax rates for individuals. 68
The corporate tax rate is a flat 21%, 69 whereas the individual tax rate is
progressive, with a series of rates between 10% and 37%. 70 This means that if
the administrative costs of treating all workers as employees for withholding
purposes causes employers to pay corporations some money they would
otherwise use to pay individual workers, then the amount of revenue collected
could (1) increase if the workers were subject to a tax rate less than 21%, or (2)
decrease if the workers were subject to a tax rate greater than 21%. Specific
statistical analysis of just what that potential increase or decrease would be is
beyond the scope of this Note. But it is enough for this Note’s purposes to note
that the increased administrative costs employers would incur if all workers were
treated like employees for withholding purposes could result in an increase or
decrease in total tax revenue collected. If it results in an increase, then not only
is the compliance purpose of withholding served, but the government also gains
more revenue based on employers changing who they pay. But if this results in
a decrease of revenue, that decrease could effectively cancel out any additional
revenue collected as a result of the higher level of compliance brought about by
imposing withholding on payments to all workers.
To summarize, treating all workers like employees for withholding purposes
results in the following. All employers would withhold a portion of what they
pay a worker. 71 That would increase compliance. 72 Increasing compliance was
the primary purpose for enacting the withholding provision. 73 Therefore, treating
all workers like employees for withholding purposes would seem to serve
purposes for which withholding was enacted, which suggests the income tax
should change tax withholding treatment in this way. But there are drawbacks.
Namely, (1) grave concerns resulting from workers having to estimate their total
taxable income for each year and report that estimate to each of their employers;
as well as (2) a lesser concern about disclosure requirements revealing private
business strategies; and (3) moderate concerns about changes in the amount of
revenue collected given increased administrative costs. On the whole, it is
unclear whether treating all workers as employees for withholding purposes

68. Compare I.R.C. § 11(b) (establishing the corporate tax rate at 21%), with I.R.C. § 1(j)(2)
(outlining a series of tax rates with 10% as the minimum and 37% as the maximum).
69. I.R.C. § 11(b).
70. I.R.C. § 1(j)(2).
71. I.R.C. § 3402(a).
72. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1 (depicting FICA and unemployment tax
reporting, which applies to employees, as nearly twice as compliant as SECA tax reporting, which
contractors pay).
73. See PAUL, supra note 56, at 330-31.

132

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 11:1

would serve the compliance purpose for which withholding was enacted any
more than the current regime already serves such purpose. Therefore, we need
to look at the converse: what does federal income tax withholding look like if we
treat all workers as contractors for withholding purposes?
If all workers were treated like contractors, then every employer would not
have to withhold the portion of that worker’s federal income tax liability from
each paycheck for that worker. On its face, failing to require employers to
withhold a portion of a paycheck any time they pay a worker will decrease
compliance. 74 And decreasing compliance directly contravenes the exact purpose
for which the federal income tax withholding provision was introduced. 75
Therefore, this treatment cuts against federal income tax compliance. And unlike
the nuance surrounding serving the compliance purpose if we treated all workers
like employees, treating all workers as contractors for withholding purposes lacks
any readily apparent advantages. The biggest piece of evidence supporting that
assertion is the tax gap regarding income tax collected from employees being
significantly less than the revenue gap collected from contractors. 76 That
basically means that the IRS has higher levels of income tax compliance
collecting from employees rather than contractors. 77 Given that, it is difficult to
justify changing the withholding treatment in a way that directly opposes the
purpose of the withholding provision without seeing any compliance advantages
in such a change. Therefore, this Note concludes that treating all workers as
contractors is not advisable in light of the withholding provision’s purpose.
In conclusion, federal income tax withholding was implemented to increase
compliance. 78 Treating all workers as employees for withholding purposes, while
seemingly a good move for tax compliance on its face, has sufficient concerns
that lead this Note to conclude that it is quite unclear whether such a change
would advance the compliance purpose of withholding. And treating all workers
as contractors for withholding purposes would decrease compliance, directly
opposing the purpose of the withholding provision while offering no apparent
compliance advantages. Therefore, this Note does not recommend either
proposed change when it comes to the compliance purpose driving federal
income tax withholding. That said, the compliance advantages on its face of
treating more, but not all workers like employees for withholding purposes may
be more desirable than the Internal Revenue Code’s current treatment. But that
depends on the effects of the concerns discussed above, and also raises issues
regarding line-drawing in an attempt to treat more workers like employees for
74. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1 (pertinently pointing to (1) individual
income tax for business income—i.e., the income of individuals working as contractors—as the
largest category of noncompliance; and (2) SECA tax underreporting (owed by contractors) being
nearly double that of FICA and unemployment tax reporting (owed by employees)).
75. See PAUL, supra note 56, at 330-31.
76. Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8 (highlighting that SECA tax underreporting (owed
by contractors) is nearly double that of FICA and unemployment tax reporting (owed by employees)).
77. See id. at 8 n. 3.
78. See PAUL, supra note 56, at 330–31.
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withholding purposes, but not all workers. Such discussion is beyond the scope
of this Note, but it warrants further inquiry.
C. Contractors as Businesses and Business Deductions
Perhaps the biggest tax distinction when it comes to employees and
contractors is that contractors are considered businesses for tax purposes, 79 and
are therefore eligible for deductions available to businesses while employees are
not. 80 This difference initially can be seen regarding the deduction of trade or
business expenses 81 in the fact that contractors can always take qualifying trade
or business expenses as deductions to reduce their taxable income, 82 while
employees are limited on that front because of the nature of their worker
classification. For section 162, which governs deductions for trade or business
expenses, the first hurdle for either classification to clear is proving that such
expense is ordinary and necessary and in the pursuit of business. “Ordinary” and
“necessary” are terms of art when it comes to tax law. A business expense is
“necessary” if it is “appropriate and helpful.” 83 And as for whether a business
expense is “ordinary,” “[l]ife in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle.” 84 Luckily for us, the Treasury lent the fullness of life a hand by laying
out some examples of ordinary and necessary business expenses—things like
supplies, advertising, and “rental for the use of business property.” 85 For
contractors, we can stop there. If they have a trade or business expense that
qualifies as ordinary and necessary, they can take it. But employees have another
hurdle to clear—as of the writing of this Note, they must get that expense
reimbursed by their employer to take that expense as a deduction.
If the employee gets their ordinary and necessary trade or business expense
reimbursed, then it is deducted “above-the-line” and factors in to calculating the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, just as this expense would do for a contractor. 86
Any of these expenses that are unreimbursed for employees, however, will be
considered miscellaneous itemized deductions. 87 And that classification is
particularly important currently because the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

79. Collins et al., supra note 3, at 8 (“From the perspective of the tax code, 1099 independent
contractors—those with either 1099-MISC non-employee compensation or an OPE 1099-K—are
self-employed. Formally, this 1099 income, like all self-employment income, is considered active
business income by the IRS. Accordingly, unless individuals become incorporated, this income
should be reported to tax authorities as proceeds from a wholly-owned business on Schedule C”).
80. Lim et al., supra note 2, at 5 (“[Contractors] are treated as sole proprietors and are entitled
to claim “above the line” business expense deductions.”).
81. I.R.C. § 162.
82. Id.
83. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
84. Id. at 115.
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a).
86. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A).
87. I.R.C. § 67(b).
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expressly disallows taxpayers from taking any miscellaneous itemized
deductions between 2018 and 2025. 88 That means that if an otherwise-qualifying
trade or business expense is unreimbursed, an employee cannot claim a deduction
for it in 2020. 89
However, the eligibility and ease with which each classification of worker
can take these ordinary and necessary business deductions are just the tip of the
iceberg when it comes to how federal taxes treat employees and contractors
differently regarding business deductions. There are also a whole host of
deductions available to businesses that contractors can take advantage of that
employees simply cannot. For example: immediate expensing of up to $1 million
dollars of business assets that constitute qualified property, 90 deducting business
losses against business income, 91 and the ability to carry forward a net operating
loss as a deduction if a contractor cannot take advantage of the whole loss in a
certain year. 92
The ability to take business deductions also has ramifications for the previous
sections of the note. Business deductions are deducted from gross income,
reducing taxable income. 93 As such, contractors that generate the same value
from their work as an employee counterpart may end up paying less income tax
because they’ve been able to deduct more expenses throughout the taxable year.
And further for contractors, SECA taxes are calculated against “self-employment
income,” which is also reduced by these deductions, 94 so contractors may end up
paying less than employees in payroll taxes too. The access to business
deductions is a huge boon for contractors when it comes to federal taxes as
compared to employees.
Our hypothetical situation with Employee and Contractor has no business
expenses to deduct (for the sake of keeping the math as simple as possible). But
as shown above, Contractor would have (1) a much easier time deducting a
business expense and would have (2) the ability to deduct more costs in general
as business expenses than Employee would. Just to throw out a very simple
example of these concepts in action, if Contractor bought a nice three-hole punch
to use in their work, they would be able to deduct that under section 162. But if
Employee bought the same three-hole punch to use at their job, they would need
their employer to reimburse that expense before Employee could take that as a
deduction.
The purpose for which the Internal Revenue Code distinguishes employees
from contractors regarding business deductions likely just reflects reality. If you

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

I.R.C. § 67(g).
See id.
I.R.C. § 179(a), (b)(1).
I.R.C. § 165(c)(1).
I.R.C. §§ 172(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2).
See I.R.C. § 62.
I.R.C. § 1401.
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are a contractor, you are your own business. 95 But if you are an employee, you
work for a business. Therefore, the purposes for which this distinction was drawn
seem to be Congress exercising its policymaking discretion in accurately
classifying which role a worker occupies, and then allowing or forbidding
workers to take certain business deductions based on their classification. For the
purposes of this Note, that will force this section to wrap up quickly, because
there simply is little analysis to be done.
If we treat all workers like employees, then the distinction falls away and all
contractors, simply because they are an individual, would lose the ability to
deduct many of the expenses Congress deemed them to be able to rightfully take
given that Congress considers contractors businesses. That would not align with
how Congress exercised its discretion regarding worker classification, nor would
that serve the purpose of allowing business deductions for all businesses, even if
that business is only one person. And if we treat all workers like contractors
regarding business deductions, then the distinction falls away and employees gain
the ability to take far more deductions than Congress intended them to be able to
take. That also cuts against Congress’ exercise of discretion and thwarts the
purpose of making sure that, in Congress’ view, business deductions are taken
only by those eligible to take them.
In both instances, the ramifications result in inequities. The government
would get more revenue if it began to deny contractors the business deductions
to which they are rightfully entitled because the contractors would end up with
greater taxable income. While that could help address the tax gap for contractors,
that simply isn’t where Congress has decided to draw the line regarding which
workers are considered businesses and are therefore eligible to take these
business deductions. And the government would get less revenue if it began to
give any employee access to the full-fledged array of business deductions for any
“business” expense because more deductions would likely be taken, resulting in
less income tax collected from employees overall.
This Note’s argument then in this section is to point out that the Internal
Revenue Code does not need to change (1) the classification of contractors as
businesses, nor (2) the resulting different eligibility of workers to take business
deductions because this current distinction is a result of line-drawing, and linedrawing always involves an element of discretion in the end. That said, given the
substantive convergence of employees and contractors in terms of (1) flexibility
of schedule and autonomy over completing work, 96 (2) number of payors, 97 and
(3) increasing legal uncertainty regarding accurately classifying a worker as one

95. Collins et al., supra note 3, at 8.
96. Lim et al., supra note 2, at 3 (“On average, workers classified as ICs should have more
control over their work process than employees; however, in practice, there will be overlap between
the two groups as many employees have flexible schedules and a large amount of autonomy in
completing their work.”).
97. Collins et al., supra note 3, at 14 (noting that “it is no more common for wage earners to
be tied to a single employer than it is for contractors to be tied to a single payer firm”).
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or the other, 98 the Internal Revenue Code might want to take a look at allowing
employees more latitude when it comes to taking the business deductions
contractors can. Or, at the very least, Congress could repeal the way the 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act started denying employees a business deduction for an
ordinary and necessary trade or business expense simply because that expense
was unreimbursed. 99 But until then, defining contractors as businesses and
employees as employees reflects reality, and the deductions to which each
classification is eligible is a result of line-drawing which Congress has already
done.
D. Work Benefits
Another way federal taxes treat employees and contractors differently relates
to a worker’s eligibility to exclude certain work benefits from gross income.
Gross income includes “all income from whatever source derived.” 100 If the
Internal Revenue Code stopped there, that would mean that any time an employer
provided a work benefit—like buying lunch for a worker—the value of that lunch
would be included in the gross income of the worker. 101 However, the Internal
Revenue Code specifies certain benefits related to the workplace that a worker
can exclude from income. Here, this Note will focus on three such benefits: (1)
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer, 102 (2) health
insurance, 103 and (3) fringe benefits. 104 A worker’s eligibility to exclude certain
work benefits from income often depends on whether that worker is classified an
employee or a contractor.
I.R.C. section 119 allows employees to exclude from gross include the value
of meals or lodging provided by, or on behalf of, their employer if those are
provided (1) to the employee for the convenience of the employer, and (2) on the
business premises of the employer (and for lodging to be excludable, the
employee must also be required to accept such lodging as a condition of
employment). 105 That section does not mention contractors at all, leaving it to
apply only to employees. The only expenses for meals and lodging contractors
are able to deduct are those incurred while away from home solely in the pursuit
of business, 106 but employees can also take such deductions. Therefore, there is

98. See Lim et al., supra note 2, at 3–4.
99. See I.R.C. § 67(g).
100. I.R.C. § 61(a).
101. See id.
102. I.R.C. § 119(a).
103. Compare I.R.C. § 106 (explaining employer-provided health insurance tax ramifications
for employees), with I.R.C. § 162(l)(1) (laying out a potential deduction for health insurance costs of
self-employed individuals).
104. I.R.C. § 132.
105. I.R.C. § 119(a); Treas. Reg. 1.119-1(a)–(b) (2020).
106. See Treas. Reg. 1.162-1–2 (2020).
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a tax advantage to being an employee regarding meals and lodging provided by
an employer.
How workers get health insurance also has different tax effects for employees
and contractors. For employees, health insurance provided by their employer is
excluded from their gross income. 107 In contrast, contractors can only take
deductions for health insurance premiums to the extent that they have net earnings
from self-employment in a taxable year. 108 And further, even if a contractor
deducts such health insurance premiums, that deduction does not factor into the
amount of earnings against which SECA taxes are calculated. 109 Therefore, not
only do contractors have to turn a profit in the taxable year from their selfemployment income in order to get any sort of health insurance premium
deduction at all, even if they do, they will still have to pay SECA taxes on their
total earnings. Compared to employees who have their health insurance
automatically excluded from gross income as long as it is provided by their
employer, and who therefore have less income against which to calculate their
FICA taxes, federal taxes privilege being an employee instead of a contractor
regarding health insurance as well.
Eligibility to take fringe benefits also varies between employees and
contractors. Fringe benefits include things like a parking spot which an employer
pays for a worker to use, employee discounts, or simply doughnuts and coffee in
the break room. 110 Employees can take all of those things and more, but
contractors are only eligible to take some. 111 Specifically, contractors are eligible
to exclude working condition fringe benefits and de minimis fringe benefits, but
are ineligible to exclude the hypothetical parking spot and employee discount
above, among other fringe benefits. 112 Therefore, employees are favored by
federal taxes here as well because they are able to exclude more perks of working
for an employer than contractors are. That said, it is comforting to know that both
employees and contractors can have a cup of coffee without worrying about
including its value in their taxable income for that year.
Our hypothetical with Employee and Contractor does not include any work
benefits like meals, lodging, health insurance premiums, or fringe benefits (for
simplicity’s sake). But if it did, Employee would be able to deduct anything in
those categories which Contractor could, and then some. The effect, assuming
that Employee and Contractor had the same income from the value of those work
107. I.R.C. § 106.
108. I.R.C. § 162(l)(2)(A); I.R.S., Topic No. 502 Medical and Dental Benefits,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc502 (last updated Jan. 20, 2021).
109. I.R.C. § 162(l)(4).
110. See I.R.C. § 132; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1 (2020).
111. See I.R.C. § 132 (using the word “employee” and never utilizing the word “contractor” in
the section when defining the various fringe benefits); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(b) (2020)
(describing that, for the purpose of I.R.C. § 132, the term “employee” might cover more people than
just employees).
112. See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 673 (explaining the differences between fringe benefits
available to employees v. contractors); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(2)(iv), (4) (2020).
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benefits identified above, 113 would be that Employee would ultimately have less
taxable income than Contractor, and Employee would therefore pay less in
federal income tax and FICA taxes. 114 Contractor, on the other hand, would have
to run through a confusing analysis of (1) which benefits they could exclude (2)
under which circumstances, and (3) how those exclusions affect Contractor’s
calculations regarding federal income tax and SECA taxes differently.
Turning now to the purposes of the provisions in this subpart, meals and
lodging for the convenience of the employer were first excluded from gross
income in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 115 A clear purpose for that section
can be found from the 1978 amendment to that provision, where members of both
the House and the Senate believed that the IRS had overstepped its bounds in
promulgating regulations regarding that section, 116 with one senator, after noting
that the Senate approved the House’s amendments, saying that the “action taken
by the Senate today is one to restore the decision making process to Congress.” 117
The very purpose of cementing the general excludability of these meals and
lodgings was for Congress to draw clear lines on the issue given the “lack of
uniform treatment of taxpayers who receive different types of benefits, even
though the benefits may have approximately the same economic value . . . .” 118
The provision excluding employer-provided health was introduced in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 119 Compared to the previous Internal Revenue
Code (of 1939), which only allowed excluding amounts received as
compensation through health insurance (and specifically not what employers paid
as premiums for health insurance to cover their employees), this expansion of
section 106 suggests a purpose to encourage employers to provide health
insurance for those who worked for them. 120

113. See I.R.C. § 132(a); see generally I.R.C. § 61 (noting that gross income is “all income
from whatever source derived[,] which would include these fringe benefits as income before they are
excluded by another section—here, that would be I.R.C. § 132).
114. See Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 675 (noting that the health insurance premiums and
medical benefits under I.R.C. § 105(b) aren’t included in the wage base of employees used to
calculated FICA taxes); see also 124 CONG. REC. 23884 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1978) (Statement of Sen.
Russel Long) (clarifying meals and lodging provided for the convenience of the employer are
excluded from the wage base used to calculate FICA and FUTA taxes).
115. I.R.C. § 119 (1954).
116. See 124 CONG. REC. Part 18, page 23883-84 (Aug. 2, 1978) (referencing the IRS
regulation that automatically disqualified meals even if provided for the convenience of the employee
if that employee had to pay even a portion for the meal and declaring such regulation as “inconsistent
with the correct reading of the law”).
117. 124 CONG. REC. part 18, page 23883 (Aug. 2, 1978) (likely holding special significance
regarding statutory purpose given that this quote came from a section with the heading “Major Issue”).
118. Id.
119. I.R.C. § 106 (1954).
120. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (2020) (permitting employers an ordinary and
necessary business deduction under I.R.C. § 162 for the payment of their employees’ health insurance
premiums), with I.R.C. § 106 (permitting employees to exclude such payments on their behalf from
gross income).
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And finally, the fringe benefits in section 132 were introduced in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984. 121 Similarly to meals and lodging, Congress’ goal in
specifying which fringe benefits would be excluded from taxable income was to
(1) “reaffirm the general rule of taxability of all forms of compensation in the
absence of a specific statutory exception,” (2) address the “dramatic use of the
noncash forms of compensation,” and (3) to prevent the “further erosion of our
tax base through the future growth of noncash compensation . . . .” 122 In essence,
Congress’ purpose in enacting the meals, lodging, and fringe benefits provisions
amounted to it seeking to exercise its line-drawing discretionary power.
In summary, these work benefits were motivated by (1) the desire to provide
clarity regarding which work benefits were excludable and which were not, and
(2) to encourage employers to provide health insurance for their employees.
If we treated all workers like employees regarding taxing work benefits, all
contractors would suddenly be eligible to exclude (1) meals and lodging provided
for the convenience of their employer, (2) every fringe benefit that was previously
only available to employees, and (3) any health insurance premiums paid to cover
that worker by the respective employer. That could further the purpose that
motivated excluding employer-provided health insurance from gross income
because employers would be able to provide health insurance for every worker
that worked for them. The counterargument here would be one based on reality.
Employers can, technically, already buy health insurance for anyone who works
for them. Therefore, even though this potential change would allow employers
to take a deduction for health insurance premiums paid for anyone who works for
them (employee or not), that doesn’t mean they would. Perhaps employers would
reserve paying for health insurance as an employee-only perk to incentivize
workers to try to get hired as employees (thus being subject to more employer
control) rather than working as contractors.
The line-drawing purposes behind excluding meals and lodging furnished for
the convenience of the employer and other fringe benefits, however, is exciting
and leaves room for real change here. Since the reason Congress enacted these
provisions and made them apply to employees was, at its core, a desire to exercise
discretion in policymaking, Congress could once again be faithful to that linedrawing purpose by (1) acknowledging that employees and contractors are
converging in many aspects of the classifications, 123 and then (2) expanding to
contractors the ability to exclude such work benefits from their income. This
Note argues here that the purposes that originally motivated specifying these
work benefits were to be excluded from income would be better served by
amending the provisions to allow contractors to exclude these work benefits just

121. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
122. 130 CONG. REC. 19,022, (1984) (discussing the reasons for the conference committee
adopting substantially the “House version of the bill providing uniform rules for the tax treatment of
various non-statutory fringe benefits”).
123. See Lim et al., supra note 2, at 3.
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like employees given the substantive convergence between the two classifications
of workers. 124
On the flip side, if we treated all workers like contractors regarding the
exclusion of work benefits for tax purposes, employees would lose the ability to
exclude the work benefits (employer-provided health insurance, meals and
lodging provided for the convenience of the employer, certain fringe benefits)
that Congress decided they should be able to exclude. Not only would that cut
against the line-drawing purposes motivating the meals and lodging and fringe
benefit exclusion provisions, but that could also decrease the amount of health
insurance provided by employers. For if this were the case, employees might be
able to choose more cost-effective plans than the ones offered to them by
employers, the premiums of which would suddenly be deductible only to the
limited extent contractors can currently deduct such health insurance premiums.
The counterargument would be that employers would still be able themselves to
deduct the premiums they pay for health insurance for their workers, 125 so
perhaps they would continue to provide health insurance for their employees, and
therefore this shift wouldn’t damage the purpose for which section 106 was
originally enacted. However, given that treating all workers like contractors
would directly oppose the policy decisions of Congress regarding the other work
benefits covered in this section, this Note does not recommend such a change.
In summary, this Note argues that given the fact that many of the traditional
distinctions between employees and contractors are dissipating, Congress could
faithfully and better serve the purposes that motivated the exclusion of certain
work benefits from income if it expanded the eligibility to exclude such benefits
to contractors just like it already does for employees. But this Note does not
recommend any change regarding the current eligibility of employees to exclude
employer-provided health insurance despite contractors not being able to do so.
E. Section 199A of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
The last aspect this Note will analyze regarding how federal taxes treat
employees and contractors differently is a recent development. Section 199A of
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created a qualified business income deduction
allowing pass-through businesses (including individuals who are contractors—
thus considered sole proprietors of their own businesses) 126 to deduct 20% of
qualified business income. 127 “Qualified business income” is the net of income,
gain, deduction, and loss from any qualified trade or business, 128 which again,
124. Id.
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (2020).
126. Lim et al., supra note 2, at 5 (explaining that contractors “are treated as sole proprietors
and are entitled to claim ‘above the line’ business expense deductions”).
127. I.R.C. § 199A(a).
128. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Provisions 11011 Section 199A –
Qualified Business Income Deductions – FAQs, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-cuts-and-jobsact-provision-11011-section-199a-qualified-business-income-deduction-faqs (Mar. 26, 2021).
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includes business operated as sole proprietorships, which is how individual
contractors can—and often do—run their business. The trade or business of
performing services as an employee is specifically disqualified for this
deduction. 129 That means that contractors who run their businesses as passthrough businesses can take a deduction of 20% of their net business income, 130
while employees cannot. That’s a staggering inequity that turns on whether an
individual is classified as an employee or a contractor.
Going back to our characters, we can recall that Employee had $92,380 of
income while Contractor had $100,000 of income. Contractor would be eligible
for this qualified business income deduction, and therefore, assuming for the
purposes of this Note that the $100,000 is the net of Contractor’s business
income, could exclude $20,000 of income simply because they are classified as a
pass-through business eligible for the deduction while Employee is specifically
barred from taking this deduction. That’s a significant boon to a worker being
considered a contractor rather than an employee. The question then becomes:
does this distinction that results from the classification of an individual worker
serve the purpose for which this provision was enacted?
Section 199A’s qualified business income deduction for pass-through
businesses was enacted to “treat corporate and non-corporate business income
more similarly under the income tax” given the House Ways and Means
Committee’s belief that the “reduction in the corporate income tax to 20 percent
provided by the bill does not completely address the income tax rate on business
income . . . [namely] the income of businesses conducted in pass-through form
or in sole proprietorship form . . . .” 131 Given that the focus of the provision was
meant to be an equitable solution addressing different forms of business income
in light of the reduction of the corporate tax rate to 21%, 132 it seems no official
consideration was given to the effects this would have regarding the taxation of
income of individual workers depending on whether they were classified as an
employee or a contractor. Proponents of the section believed it was needed to
bring pass-through businesses to the same level of taxation as corporations, while
opponents contended it created an “arbitrary preference for pass-through business
income over other sources of income . . . .” 133 What was lost in the effort to
achieve equity for different forms of business income (at least as indicated by
what was not discussed in the Ways and Means Committee report) is that this
created a significant tax advantage for individuals classified as contractors rather
than employees. Nevertheless, this Note will still analyze whether treating all

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(B).
See Thomas, supra note 16, at 1424.
H.R. REP. No. 115-409, at 129 (2017).
I.R.C. § 11(b).
Scott Greenberg & Nicole Kaeding, Reforming the Pass-Through Deduction, TAX
FOUNDATION, at 2 (June 21, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/reforming-pass-through-deduction199a/.
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workers as one classification or the other serves the business income equity
purposes of the section.
If all workers were treated like employees under this section, then contractors
who would have previously been eligible for this deduction would lose that
eligibility because employees are specifically barred from taking this
deduction. 134 That would directly oppose the purpose of this section—which
was, in essence, to acknowledge that business income came in all different forms,
and pass-through business (like contractors) should receive a deduction aimed at
achieving equity with the reduction in corporate tax rate implemented by the
TCJA. Treating all workers like employees for the purpose of section 199A
would bar certain pass-through business (here, contractors) from taking the
deduction, which has literally the opposite effect for which the section was
enacted. This Note would not recommend treating all workers like employees
under this section.
If all workers were treated like contractors, on the other hand, this Note
argues that wouldn’t make a difference within the statutory provisions of this
section. This is because even if we wanted to make employees eligible to receive
this deduction like contractors are, the “trade or business of performing services
as an employee” 135 is still statutorily disqualified as a form of business income
that qualifies for this deduction. Therefore, this change could not be enacted
without Congress deleting one of the two categories of trades or businesses that
specifically don’t qualify for this deduction, 136 which would defeat the purpose
behind that provision. And even if we did away with that limitation, there
suddenly would be an enormous amount of the U.S. workforce receiving about a
20% income deduction across the board—corporations, pass-through business
(like contractors), and now employees. If that were the case, the effect of this
proposed change would essentially amount to a 20% reduction in taxable income
for most taxpayers, and while the TCJA’s overall stated purpose was in part to
“reduce tax burdens on families and individuals,” 137 this Note believes that if
Congress had wanted to reduce the tax burden by the amount effectuated by this
proposed change, Congress would have just done so in the first place given that
the Act passed in a straight party-line vote through budget reconciliation.
Therefore, this Note argues that neither treating all workers as employees nor
treating all workers as contractors is desirable given the purposes for which
section 199A was enacted. But this Note wanted to analyze section 199A
nonetheless because it is an enormous difference that now exists for individual
workers’ taxes depending solely on whether they are classified as an employee or
a contractor. And this Note would like to encourage deeper thinking on the
effects of this section because in striving to achieve equity across taxation of

134.
135.
136.
137.

See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(B).
Id.
See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1).
See H.R. REP. No. 115-409, supra note 131, at 112.
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business income, Congress decimated equity between the income of individual
workers based on which classification that worker receives.
F. Summary of Differences, Purposes, and Note Recommendations
A general summary of this Note’s analysis for this Part is below.
1. Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Taxes:
x

x
x

x

Employees split their payroll tax liability with their employer.
Contractors pay their payroll tax liability all themselves. This is not
just a procedural difference. It affects the amount of payroll taxes
collected from each worker depending on whether they’re classified
as an employee or a contractor.
The purpose of these taxes was to fund their respective programs.
With Social Security and Medicare facing funding shortfalls, this Note
does not recommend treating workers all as either employees or
contractors. The payroll taxes collected from employees and their
employers combined is, on a starting level, less than those collected
from contractors. But there are serious compliance concerns if no
payroll taxes were withheld. That said, this Note concludes that
treating more employees as contractors for payroll tax purposes could
potentially better serve the funding purposes for which these taxes
were enacted. But that change involves difficult line-drawing
concerns and the compliance issues remain.
It is more advantageous to be an employee for the purposes of Social
Security, Medicare, and unemployment payroll taxes.

2. Federal Income Tax Withholding:
x
x
x

x

Employees have a portion of their income tax withheld by employers.
Contractors do not.
The purpose of federal income tax withholding was to increase tax
compliance.
This Note does not recommend treating all workers as either
employees or contractors. While treating every worker as an
employee on its face would seem to increase compliance, there are
significant concerns regarding estimation, disclosure, and
administrative costs that deter this Note from advocating that change.
And treating every worker as a contractor would decrease compliance.
While there may be a way to attain more compliance by treating more
contractors like employees for withholding purposes, that linedrawing is difficult and finding that exact right balance is not the aim
of this Note.
It is unclear whether it is more advantageous to be an employee or a
contractor for federal income tax withholding purposes. While
employees have a portion of their income tax withheld and therefore
face less risk of underpayment and IRS penalties, contractors receive
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more money in their pockets given that none is withheld, conferring
on them the time-value of that “extra” money yet exposing them to
greater risk of underpayment and IRS penalties.
3. Contractors as Businesses and Business Deductions:
x

x

x

x

Contractors can take more deductions related to business expenses
than employees can. Contractors also have an easier time qualifying
for such deductions.
The purpose of these provisions was to effectuate Congressional
discretion regarding which workers were businesses and which were
not, and then resulting eligibility to take certain deductions.
This Note recommends that, as these sections were enacted as a
display of Congressional discretion regarding which taxpayers qualify
as businesses and eligibility for deductions as such, Congress can
faithfully serve that purpose by (1) acknowledging the dissipation of
the traditional differences between employees and contractors, and (2)
easing the requirements to take certain business deductions as an
employee (namely the 2017 TCJA’s prohibition on deductions for
unreimbursed ordinary and necessary business expenses).
It is far more advantageous to be a contractor for tax purposes when it
comes to business deductions.

4. Work Benefits:
x

x

x

x

Employees are able to exclude more work benefits—like meals and
lodging provided for the convenience of the employer, employerprovided healthcare, and other fringe benefits from their taxable
income—than contractors can.
The purposes for enacting these provisions allowing exclusion of such
benefits were (1) for Congress to exercise its decision-making
authority to specify which fringe benefits were and were not
excludable from income given the rise in noncash forms of
compensation, and (2) seemingly to encourage employers to provide
employees with health insurance.
This Note recommends that, as these sections were enacted
specifically so that Congress could exercise its discretion (in part due
to a perception that IRS regulations overstepped the law), Congress
could faithfully and better serve these discretionary purposes by (1)
acknowledging the increasing substantive convergence of employees
and contractors, and (2) expanding the current eligibility employees
have in excluding certain work benefits to contractors as well.
It is more advantageous to be an employee for tax purposes when it
comes to excluding work benefits.

5. Section 199A of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

FALL 2021]

Individuals as “Employees” or “Contractors”

x

145

Individuals who are contractors can deduct 20% of their net business
income while individuals who are employees are specifically barred
from this deduction.
x
The purpose of this section was to create more equity among forms of
business income given that the TCJA capped the corporate tax rate at
21%, yet pass-through businesses were still being taxed at rates that
applied to individual taxpayers.
x
This Note argues that treating all workers either as employees or
contractors is not desirable given the purposes of this section.
However, this Note would implore Congress to realize that in pursuing
equity regarding different forms of business income, it has created
significant inequity for individual taxpayers depending on whether
they are classified as an employee or a contractor.
x
It is far more advantageous to be a contractor for tax purposes when it
comes to section 199A and its qualified business income deduction.
In conclusion, federal taxes have quite a few different effects for individual
workers depending on whether that worker is classified as an employee or a
contractor. For some provisions, like employer-provided work benefits and some
business deductions, Congress could both (1) update the Internal Revenue Code
to accurately reflect today’s realities regarding the similarity of work that
employees and contractors do by extending eligibility for those tax benefits to the
group currently ineligible; and (2) faithfully serve the initial purpose for which
Congress enacted those provisions—an exercise of Congressional decisionmaking power regarding eligibility for tax exclusions and deductions reflecting
the realities of the workforce. For other provisions of federal taxes, like payroll
taxes and federal income tax withholding, there is at least an open question
whether a little tinkering in treating more workers like contractors or employees,
respectively, might better serve the purposes for which those provisions were
enacted. And for section 199A introduced by the 2017 TCJA, even though
Congress was pursuing equity for different forms of business income, it ended up
creating significant inequity for individual workers that turns on whether a
worker is classified as an employee or a contractor. This Note argues that it
would be beneficial to explore how Congress balanced the equity pursued by
199A against the inequity it created—if it did that balancing at all.
It is also unclear whether being an employee or a contractor is preferable
when it comes to federal taxes overall, but this Note would argue that it is more
advantageous to be a contractor. On the one hand, employees get to exclude lots
of employer-provided work benefits and end up paying slightly less in payroll
taxes. But contractors will likely pay far less in income tax given that they can
take a wide array of business deductions (including traditional ones as well as the
recent qualified business income deduction from section 199A of the TCJA) and
can deduct half of what they pay in SECA taxes 138 from their gross income in
calculating taxable income. The eligibility to take these business deductions and
138.

I.R.C. § 164(f).
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the amount these deductions can shave off a contractor’s gross income likely
make it more advantageous to be a contractor. But a complete analysis of whether
that is the case is beyond the scope of this Note, which set out to identify the
ramifications for federal tax purposes, then to scrutinize whether that distinct
treatment served the purposes for which the sections were enacted.
III. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF SCHOLARLY PROPOSED TAX REFORM
With those takeaways from Part II in mind, this Note will now apply them by
considering tax reform proposals from a prominent tax scholar. In Kathleen
DeLaney Thomas’ 2018 article, Taxing the Gig Economy, Thomas proposes (1)
a “non-employee withholding regime” and (2) a “standard business deduction”
for gig workers. 139 These two proposed tax reforms are pertinent to this Note
because they address distinctions in federal tax law affecting contractors.
Thomas’ stated goals for the reforms are reducing “tax compliance burdens for
[millions of American workers who earn income through ‘gig’ work and are
considered business owners (i.e., contractors) for tax purposes], while
simultaneously enhancing the government’s ability to collect tax revenue.” 140
Given that the analysis of this Note has focused on (1) the difference in
compliance for employees and contractors; (2) concerns that arise when
proposing that payors withhold, for tax purposes, some of what they would
otherwise pay contractors; and (3) the numerous business deductions already
available to contractors (specifically, “gig workers” in Thomas’ article), this Note
wanted to explore these proposals. This Note believes both proposals present a
potential beneficial step toward reconciling the distinct treatment of employees
and contractors within the context of federal tax law to reflect the economic
realities of the workforce today more accurately. But they each present some
wrinkles that are worth analyzing.
A. Thomas’ Proposed “Non-Employee Withholding”
Thomas’ proposal for a “non-employee withholding” regime aims to have
payors withhold a portion of what they pay an individual contractor to cover that
worker’s income and self-employment tax obligations arising from that
payment. 141 This proposal would create equity with that way employers currently
withhold some of what they pay their employees to cover those workers’ income
and FICA tax obligations. 142 In general, Thomas’ proposed “non-employee
withholding” outlines a scope where payors (1) only begin to withhold once
beyond the $600 1099-MISC reporting threshold, 143 (2) are subject to it only

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Thomas, supra note 16, at 1415.
Id.
See id. at 1447.
See id. at 1443.
See I.R.C. § 6041(a).
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when the payor hires the contractor in the course of the payor’s business, and (3)
attempt to withhold only for individual contractors (and not other businesses that
have their own withholding requirements). 144 There are many meritorious
reasons for this proposal bearing on the proposed scope that Thomas identifies.
Among them are the fact that aiming this withholding at smaller contractors will
help them navigate compliance requirements, 145 leading to less penalties for
missed estimated payments and more revenue for the IRS overall. 146
Additionally, limiting this requirement to whenever payors hire contractors in the
course of business would seem a logical extension of the systems these payors
likely have in place for withholding regarding their full-time employees. 147
However, there are also issues that arise relating to this proposed scope. The
first is that triggering this requirement only if such payment exceeds $600 could
leave a substantial part of a contractor’s income un-withheld, especially those
doing small projects for many different payors throughout the taxable year. The
gross income of such a contractor includes “all income from whatever source
derived,” 148 not just income that exceeds $600. Therefore, if the non-employee
withholding starts only beyond that threshold, many of the same compliance
issues remain. 149 In fact, it may end up being even more confusing for the
contractors at which this proposal is aimed to figure out which payors have
withheld some money and which paychecks require the contractor to tuck some
money away for their estimated quarterly payments.
The second issue is that deciding whether a contractor was or was not hired
in the course of the payor’s business could require inquiries into what the payor’s
business is and whether the contractor’s work was done in the course of it. This
issue would be especially present for contractors that work for smaller or newer
businesses, which are increasingly hiring contractors instead of employees.150
And given the world’s collective experience with the COVID-19 pandemic, a
plumber called to someone’s home is likely conferring a personal benefit as well
as a business-related benefit since the pandemic has forced many workers to work
from home. Those issues aside, this Note wholeheartedly supports Thomas’
focusing the scope of this proposal so it does not apply to other businesses with
their own withholding requirements, because that focus is sensible and would

144. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 1443–45.
145. Id. at 1437.
146. See id. at 1438–39.
147. See id. at 1440.
148. I.R.C. § 61(a).
149. While Thomas suggests on page 1444 that “[p]ayers that anticipated an ongoing
relationship with a service provider or seller of goods could begin withholding with the first payment
even if it was under the threshold, though there would be no penalty for failing to do so,” mitigating
this concern somewhat, there would be no requirement to do so, and the compliance worries therefore
remain.
150. Lim et al., supra note 2, at 3 (“Our firm level analysis shows that growth in the use of
[independent contractor] labor, as measured by multiple metrics, is concentrated among small firms,
which we define as those with few employees”).
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reduce confusion regarding withholding since it would avoid companies
withholding each other’s tax liability in a weird tax catch-22.
In the part of her article where Thomas proposes that this withholding cover
SECA taxes for the contractors, Thomas states that economically, “it probably
doesn’t matter who is nominally responsible for payroll taxes; if the platform
company (or other payer) were responsible for half of those taxes, they would
likely reduce gross payments to workers to compensate.” 151 However, the
analysis in this Note evinces that there is an economic difference regarding who
pays these Social Security and Medicare taxes, especially if the payor and
contractor share the cost like employees and employers currently do. And this
Note points out that this difference is the very result of reducing gross payments
to workers to compensate. Therefore, this Note believes that the purposes for
which SECA taxes were imposed (funding Social Security and Medicare) would
probably be better served if the contractor remained on the hook for all of it
because that would theoretically generate more revenue. Further, this proposal
would likely create an administrative nightmare for the IRS, as it would be trying
to keep up with different payors attempting to pay different amounts of an
individual’s SECA tax liability while still trying to get the remaining half from
the contractor themselves. While the compliance concerns that accompany a
decision to leave a contractor to their own devises are significant, this Note
believes this proposal would do harm to the purpose for which SECA taxes were
imposed.
The rest of Thomas’ proposal aligns with this Note as it explores the
difficulties in trying to determine the correct amount to withhold—which was the
main reason this Note did not recommend treating all workers like employees for
income tax withholding purposes—including all the complexities surrounding
determining the net income of a contractor, which this Note believes is extremely
difficult. 152 It concludes by granting the contractor the right to opt-out of this
non-employee withholding proposal for one reason or another, such as the
withholding creating liquidity issues or a contractor simply preferring to deal with
their own tax burdens. 153 While this Note believes granting the ability to opt-out
is an equitable one, it has concerns about what that means for the practical effect
of this proposal. Specifically, if contractors can opt out on a whim, (1) do
compliance and revenue benefits gained by withholding some compensation of
those contractors who don’t opt-out outweigh (2) the headache that would
accompany payors trying to remember for whom they have to withhold money
and for whom they do not, or the IRS trying to figure out which payors it needs
to go after if a contractor mistakenly believes they did not opt-out and therefore
only paid a portion of the federal taxes they owe? The counterargument to this
Note’s concerns would be that this proposal, even though it leaves in place some
old issues regarding contractor compliance, would at least increase compliance
151.
152.
153.

Thomas, supra note 16, at 1445.
See id. at 1445-53.
Id. at 1453.
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and revenue to some degree. To that extent, this Note agrees that the proposal
has significant merit, but there are concerns that it raises specifically relating to
this Note’s analysis regarding the reasons for which the withholding and payroll
tax provisions were enacted that are worth exploring.
In sum, the balancing to be done regarding this proposal is (1) how Congress
would value the potential benefit to tax compliance this withholding would
engender versus (2) concerns about (a) the practical administration of this
proposal and (b) concerns this Note set out in the previous part. As relevant here,
those concerns are grave concerns about estimation and more moderate concerns
about disclosure and administrative costs for the payors.
B. Thomas’ Proposed “Standard Business Deduction” for Gig Workers
Thomas also proposes a “standard business deduction” for gig workers,
which would allow such contractors to take a deduction of “a fixed amount—
based on a percentage of gross receipts—that could be deducted in lieu of actual
business expenses.” 154 According to Thomas, this “would, therefore, eliminate
the need to track and report those expenses.” 155 Noting current qualities of
federal taxes, such as (1) the confusing nature of tax rules, (2) that expenses are
reported “on an honor system,” and that (3) “expense tracking and reporting is
time-consuming and burdensome, even for taxpayers who are familiar with the
rules,” Thomas aims this proposal at mitigating those issues, “reducing evasion
and unintentional noncompliance and virtually eliminating tax recordkeeping
requirements for many small businesses.” 156 This Note interprets that last goal
as an attempt to help contractors take more of the business deductions for which
they are eligible (some of which are discussed in Part II(3) of this Note). But this
Note believes the goals of the proposal therefore seem at odds with each other,
especially given that the deduction is permissive.
Starting with the goal of eliminating tax recordkeeping requirements, Thomas
writes that the standard business deduction should be targeted “at truly ‘small’
business owners.” 157 But this Note believes that these smaller business (like
contractors) may be the ones who, as Thomas says, “have no idea what sorts of
costs are deductible from their business receipts or how to properly record their
expenses.” 158 Thomas elaborates that given such uncertainty regarding eligibility
for business deductions, taxpayers “will inevitably file inaccurate returns, which
may [either] [1] deprive them of deductions that they are entitled to or [2]
shortchange the government of tax revenue.” 159 The general idea is that if
taxpayers underreport their business expenses, that is unfair to them because they

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1454.
Id.
Thomas, supra note 16, at 1454.
Id. at 1459.
Id. at 1454.
Id. at 1455.
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are eligible to take business deductions for more, whereas if they overreport, the
government loses revenue because taxpayers will be claiming more business
deductions.
This permissive quality of this proposal therefore makes it a windfall to those
smaller business who cannot keep track of which business expenses qualify as a
deduction. Those who traditionally underreport (and give the government more
revenue than it is entitled to as a result) will likely always opt to take the standard
business deduction if it gives them a greater deduction than what they think they
are otherwise entitled to. While that would be an honorable way to make sure
such businesses (including contractors) receive the deductions to which Congress
believes they are entitled (which this Note identified as the purpose for treating
employees and contractors differently regarding eligibility to take many business
deductions), this standard business deduction would likely undermine the other
aim of this proposal. That is because federal tax law worries about evasion and
noncompliance because the government is worried it may not be collecting all
the taxes it is owed. Therefore, while the standard business deduction would help
reduce evasion and unintentional noncompliance for businesses by eliminating
burdensome recordkeeping requirements, that same reduction will also likely
reduce the revenue the government collects, which brings the aims of this
proposal in conflict with each other. Further, because the standard business
deduction is permissive, all the concerns that Thomas focuses on in this section
regarding unintentional and intentional overreporting 160 would likely remain.
This is because those taxpayers and businesses intent on overreporting their
business expenses would likely still try to do so, intentional or not, because they
would believe that they could get away with claiming more in total deductions
than the standard business deduction would otherwise allow them. Therefore, the
proposal ends up giving traditionally underreporting businesses a greater
deduction while allowing traditionally overreporting businesses to still try to get
away with overreporting because this proposal is permissive.
This Note loves that this proposal would help contractors claim the business
deductions to which they are entitled, as that was Congress’ purpose for enacting
all the tax provisions granting deductions for business expenses to contractors.
However, this Note is concerned whether this proposal can reconcile its stated
purposes given the brief analysis above. If the standard business deduction is
meant to deliver the business deductions Congress believed businesses—even
individual contractors—were entitled to when it enacted those provisions, then
that serves the purpose of the legislation but raises greater concerns about a
decrease in revenue the government would be able to collect from contractors—
an already difficult group to wrangle. 161 And if, on the other hand, the standard
business deduction is meant to reduce evasion, noncompliance, and tax

160. Id.
161. See Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 44, at 8, fig.1 (pointing to individual income tax for
business income—i.e., the income of individuals working as contractors—as the largest category of
noncompliance).
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recordkeeping requirements for small businesses, 162 then this Note believes an
analysis is needed regarding how many contractors do not take as many business
deductions as they are entitled to, and as a result end up giving the government
more money than it would otherwise collect from them. This Note believes such
analysis is needed because the reasons underlying compliance and evasion
concerns—namely, the government not getting enough revenue—would be
defeated by such underreporting contractors suddenly having the ability to take
the standard business deduction as it would likely grant them a greater deduction
than what they were planning on claiming without it.
Overall, both of Thomas’ proposals serve the purposes for which the
withholding and eligibility regarding business deductions provisions were
established, and this Note believes they have much merit, especially in a day and
age where the substantive differences between contractors and employees are
dissipating. 163 But this Note has enough concerns about the practical effects each
proposal would bring to caution it against endorsing them wholeheartedly
without further analysis focused on projections of their impact. While these
proposals are aimed at helping contractors given (1) that many U.S. workers
occupy that role these days and (2) the ease with which one can be a contractor
while working remotely from home (an experience many taxpayers have likely
come to know intimately), they also raise questions related to implementation and
effect. And because of that, while this Note believes the proposals could be
beneficial in addressing the different treatment of employees and contractors
within federal tax law, this Note would like to see further statistical research on
them before endorsing either proposal as a way to address the different ways
federal taxes apply to employees and contractors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal tax law can breathe a sigh of relief, however, in knowing it is not
alone in experiencing difficulties and promulgating inequities surrounding the
employee / contractor distinction. Statutes and other areas of law employ a whole
bunch of different tests to draw this distinction, 164 suggesting there is a lack of
clarity regarding the best way to determine whether a worker is an employee or a
contractor. And even when an area of law makes a conclusion about the
classification of a worker, that conclusion may not be binding between different
jurisdictions. 165 Further, even when there is general consensus that a certain test
applies to a certain situation, courts and administrative agencies can disagree
about what, exactly, the test requires. 166 The ramifications of the employee /
162. Thomas, supra note 16, at 1454.
163. See Lim et al., supra note 2, at 3.
164. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 680–82 (noting that different statutes and areas of law use
the common law agency test, economic realities test, or ABC tests).
165. Id. at 670–80
166. Id. at 681 (noting that there is general acknowledgement “that the common law test
applies for [National Labor Relations Act] purposes, [but] exactly what the test requires is
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contractor distinction extend beyond the world of federal tax as well. For
example, the distinction determines whether and to what extent a worker has a
right to “minimum-wage, collective bargaining, workplace benefits, [and] health
and safety.” 167 But just because there is confusion surrounding the distinction
and the stakes regarding the classification are high does not mean that federal tax
law should not try to champion change.
Congress can alter parts of the Internal Revenue Code to better reflect the
realities of today’s workforce. In fact, this Note argues that there are ways for it
to do so regarding certain provisions discussed in this Note that would also more
faithfully serve the purposes for which those provisions were enacted.
Specifically, Congress can further the line-drawing purposes motivating
eligibility for business deductions and exclusion of work benefits from taxable
income by allowing employees and contractors the ability to utilize more of those
provisions, respectively. For other provisions, while a change may on its face
acknowledge the substantive convergence of the qualities of an “employee” and
a “contractor” and seemingly serve the purpose for which they were enacted,
there are countervailing considerations that lead this Note to conclude that further
analysis beyond the scope of this Note is warranted before potentially advocating
for such a change. In particular, the provisions discussed regarding payroll taxes
and federal income tax withholding might be better served if all workers were
treated like contractors and employees, respectively, but there are practical
concerns surrounding such a change that may end up opposing the programfunding and compliance purposes for which those sections were enacted. And
for section 199A of the TCJA, this Note would advocate for Congress to consider
and issue a statement on how it weighs the equity it sought to pursue for different
forms of business income against the enormous inequity it created for individual
workers depending on whether they are classified as an employee or contractor.
All in all, this Note hoped to provide some takeaways surrounding the
employer / contractor distinction in federal tax law. These takeaways are meant
to support this Note’s two main arguments: that (1) federal tax law draws an
increasingly arbitrary and unfair line between employees and contractors given
the modern substantive convergence of work done as an “employee” or a
“contractor”; and (2) updating how the distinction is drawn and applied can better
serve the purposes of the federal tax provisions that treat employees and
contractors differently.
First among the takeaways, federal tax law has the means to effectuate any
desired change in how certain provisions apply to different classifications of
workers primarily because of the vast multifactor test it employs to make that
distinction. Second, in general, it seems being a contractor is more advantageous
than being an employee for federal tax purposes primarily because of the

contested . . . . [C]ourts and the National Labor Relations Board (‘NLRB’) have sparred [for example]
over how important it is that the worker has ‘significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss’
(which suggests independent contractor status)”).
167. See, e.g., id. at 654.
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availability of various business deductions. Third, if Congress wanted, it could
statutorily update the provisions discussed above to more accurately reflect the
dissipation of the traditional differences between employees and contractors,
which would better serve the purposes for which those provisions were enacted.
Fourth, scholarly-proposed tax reform addresses some of the inequities
promulgated by the I.R.C. in its distinct treatment of employees and contractors
that is promising, but merits further consideration. And finally, federal tax law
is not alone in struggling with the effects of this distinction. But despite that
struggle and the inconsistencies surrounding the distinction, one fact remains
quite clear: regardless of whether we think we work as “employees” or
“contractors”, it matters what we are called when it comes to federal taxes.

